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Using Local Public Goods to Attract and Retain the Creative 
Class: A Tale of Two Cities  
Abstract 
We study the impact that the provision of a local public good (LPG) by two cities has on 
their ability to attract and retain members of the creative class. This creative class consists of two 
types of members known as engineers and artists. Engineers are wealthier than artists and they 
also value the LPG more. We first focus on each city in isolation. We compute the marginal value 
and the marginal cost of the LPG and then determine the provision of this LPG when the provision 
is determined by uniform contributions and majority voting. Next, we allow the creative class 
members to migrate between the two cities and analyze whether engineers or artists migrate, the 
equilibrium distribution of the creative class, and the efficiency of the LPG provision. Finally, we 
consider the situation in each city just before migration and study how much of the LPG is provided 
when proportional contributions and majority voting determine this provision. A related question 
we address is whether engineers or artists now have an incentive to migrate and, if yes, we identify 
who would like to migrate and to which city.  
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1. Introduction 
 As a result of his many contributions to the literatures in urban economics and regional 
science in the last two decades, Richard Florida has been successful in popularizing the twin 
notions of the creative class and creative capital. In this regard, Florida (2002, p. 68) points out 
that the creative class “consists of people who add economic value through their creativity.” This 
class consists of professionals such as doctors, engineers, lawyers, scientists, university professors, 
and, notably, bohemians such as artists, musicians, and sculptors. The distinguishing feature of 
these people is that they possess creative capital which is defined to be the “intrinsically human 
ability to create new ideas, new technologies, new business models, new cultural forms, and whole 
new industries that really [matter]” (Florida, 2005, p. 32).  
 A key point made by Florida in his many writings5 and by his adherents such as Stolarick 
et al. (2011) is that urban and regional planners ought to focus substantively on the activities of 
the creative class because the group of people comprising this class gives rise to ideas, information, 
and technology, outputs that are significant for the growth of cities and regions. Therefore, cities 
and regions that want to prosper in this era of globalization need to do all they can to attract and 
retain members of this creative class who are, for all intents and purposes, the basic drivers of 
economic growth. 
 Is there any difference between the prominent and established notion of human capital and 
Florida’s newer concept of creative capital? In answering this question, Batabyal and Beladi 
(2018) have rightly noted that there is little or no difference between the notions of human and 
creative capital when the accumulation of this creative capital depends on the completion of many 
years of formal education. In contrast, there can be a lot of difference between the notions of human 
                                                            
5  
See, for instance, Florida (2002, 2003, 2014). 
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and creative capital when creative capital is either present innately or when it is based on the 
accumulation of professional and business experiences but not on the completion of a formal 
education. Because creative capital is of two types, it is, as noted by Porter and Batabyal (2016), a 
more general concept than the primarily schooling based notion of human capital. Batabyal and 
Beladi (2018) refer to members of the creative class whose possession of creative capital is the 
result of many years of schooling as engineers and to those who possess creative capital either 
innately or largely by gathering professional and business experiences as artists. In this way of 
looking at the issue, the aggregate creative class in, for instance, a city is the sum of the engineers 
and the artists in this city.6 We shall utilize this two-part classification of the creative class in our 
subsequent analysis in this paper.  
 Once one accept’s Florida’s (2002) contention that cities seeking to thrive economically 
need to attract and retain members of the creative class, the next logical question is “How are cities 
to do this?” Florida (2002, 2008) and other researchers such as Buettner and Janeba (2016) have 
answered this question by pointing out that local public goods (LPGs) such as cultural amenities, 
quality schools, and public transit are a key means by which cities can effectively undertake the 
dual “attract” and “retain” functions.7 Even though this point is now understood, to the best of our 
knowledge, there are no theoretical studies of the impact that the provision of LPGs by cities has 
on their ability to attract and retain members of the creative class.8 Given this lacuna in the 
literature, our objective in this paper is to provide the first theoretical analysis of the provision of 
                                                            
6  
See Marlet and Van Woerkens (2007) for additional details on this point. 
7  
See Audretsch and Belitski (2013) for a discussion of related issues. 
8  
For theoretical analyses of other questions concerning the creative class, see Usman and Batabyal (2014), Batabyal and Beladi 
(2016), and Batabyal and Nijkamp (2016). That said, the reader should understand that there is no overlap between the issues we 
study in the present paper and the questions analyzed in these cited papers.  
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a LPG by two cities and the effect that this provision has on the ability of these two cities to attract 
and retain members of the creative class.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates our model of an 
aggregate economy that consists of two cities. As noted previously, the creative class consists of 
two types of members known as engineers and artists. Engineers are wealthier than artists and they 
also value the LPG more. Section 3 focuses on each city in isolation. Section 3.1 computes the 
marginal value and the marginal cost of the LPG for both engineers and artists. Section 3.2 
determines the willingness to pay for the LPG on the part of the engineers and the artists. Section 
3.3 studies the optimal provision of the LPG in each city when this provision is made on the basis 
of uniform contributions and majority voting. Section 4 concentrates on the case in which 
engineers and artists can migrate between the two cities. Section 4.1 examines which creative class 
members migrate. Section 4.2 first describes and then discusses a key property of the equilibrium 
distribution of the creative class in the two cities. Section 4.3 studies whether the provision of the 
LPG in each city is efficient. Section 5 analyzes the section 4 scenario just before migration. 
Section 5.1 asks how much of the LPG will be provided in each city when this provision is made 
on the basis of proportional contributions and majority voting. Section 5.2 studies whether any 
creative class member will now want to migrate. Finally, section 6 concludes and then suggests 
two ways in which the research described in this paper might be extended.  
2. The Theoretical Framework  
Consider an aggregate economy that consists of two cities denoted by ܣ and ܤ. From a real 
world perspective, we can think of these cities in one of two ways. In the first interpretation, these 
two cities are geographically proximate only and examples of such cities would include 
Minneapolis and Saint Paul (in Minnesota), Buffalo and Rochester (in New York), and Dallas and 
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Fort Worth (in Texas). In the second interpretation, these two cities are not only geographically 
proximate but they also have a water body of some sort that plays a major role in the lives of the 
two cities. Examples include Minneapolis and Saint Paul with the Mississippi river running 
through Minneapolis, Newcastle and Gateshead (in England) with the Tyne river separating them, 
and Reggio Calabria and Messina (in Italy),9 on either side of the Strait of Messina.  
Our analysis focuses on the creative class in each of these two cities. As such, let us denote 
the engineers and the artists---who together comprise the creative class in each city---by ߳ and ߙ, 
respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that the engineers are wealthier than the artists. 
Engineers have an income of ܫఢ ൌ $2000 and artists have an income of ܫఈ=$1000.  
Both cities seek to attract and retain members of the creative class by providing a LPG such 
as a quality school, a cultural amenity, or public transit, that we denote by ܮ. Again, without loss 
of generality, we suppose that engineers value the LPG more than the artists.10 Specifically, the 
value of the LPG to each type of individual in the creative class is given by 
 
௜ܸ ൌ ௅ூ೔ଵ଴ െ
௅మ
ଶ , ݅ ൌ ߙ, ߳.      (1) 
 
Finally, the cost of the LPG per resident in either city is given by11  
                                                            
9  
See Musolino (2018) for additional details. 
10  
This and the preceding assumption that the engineers are wealthier than the artists together tell us that the richer members of the 
creative class value the LPG more than the poorer members. This implication is supported by the work of Emerson (not dated) and 
Banzhaf (2014). That said, excluding the knife edge case in which both engineers and artists value the LPG equally, our results 
would essentially be reversed if we assumed that the artists are relatively wealthier and that they value the LPG more than the 
engineers. In other words, the conclusions we state about engineers (artists) in this paper would be true of artists (engineers) if we 
were to alter the two assumptions mentioned above.  
11  
The reader will note that we have used specific numerical values to describe some of the variables (such as 2000	ܽ݊݀	1000ሻ and 
coefficients (such as 5ሻ. We have done this mainly to simplify the mathematical analysis in what follows and to obtain concrete 
results. If, instead, we worked with general values then it would be extremely difficult to obtain tangible results because the 
subsequent mathematical analysis would give rise to algebraic expressions that could not be interpreted without additional 
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ܥ ൌ 5ܮ.       (2) 
With this description of our aggregate economy of two cities out of the way, our next task 
is to analyze the provision of the LPG in each city in isolation.12 To this end, we first compute the 
marginal value and the marginal cost of the LPG for both engineers and artists. 
3. Two Cities as Isolated Units 
3.1. Marginal values and costs 
 Differentiating equation (2) with respect to ܮ, it is clear that the marginal cost of the LPG 
to both the engineers and the artists is  
ܯܥ ൌ 5.       (3) 
Substituting ܫఢ ൌ 2000 in equation (1) and then differentiating this equation with respect to ܮ, the 
marginal value of the LPG for the engineers is  
ܯ ఢܸ ൌ 200 െ ܮ.      (4) 
Using an analogous process, the corresponding marginal value for the artists is  
ܯ ఈܸ ൌ 100 െ ܮ.      (5) 
Next, let us ascertain the willingness to pay (WTP) for the LPG on the part of the engineers and 
the artists. 
3.2. Willingness to pay for the LPG 
 To determine the ܹ ܶ ఢܲ for the LPG on the part of the engineers, we substitute their income 
ܫఢ ൌ 2000 in equation (1) with ݅ ൌ ߳. This gives us 
                                                            
assumptions. That said, we emphasize that qualitatively speaking, our modeling strategy is without loss of generality in the sense 
that results similar to what we obtain can be obtained for any (sensible) numerical values of the relevant variables and coefficients. 
In addition, note that in any real world scenario, we would have to work with actual numbers of the sort we utilize in this paper. 
The only issue to recognize here is the ex ante, we typically do not know the values of these variables. 
12  
The objective function in equation (1) is quadratic in ܮ and hence the first-order necessary conditions for an optimum such as 
equations (4) and (5) below are linear in ܮ. Therefore, our modeling framework can be thought of as one kind of linear-quadratic 
framework. 
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ܹܶ ఢܲ ൌ 200ܮ െ ௅
మ
ଶ .      (6) 
 
Similarly, substituting ܫఈ ൌ 1000 in equation (1) with ݅ ൌ ߙ, the ܹܶ ఈܲ for the LPG for the artists 
is  
 
ܹܶ ఈܲ ൌ 100ܮ െ ௅
మ
ଶ .      (7) 
 
Having ascertained these two WTP expressions, we now want to analyze the optimal provision of 
the LPG in each city when this provision is made on the basis of uniform contributions and majority 
voting.  
3.3. Uniform contributions and LPG provision 
 To analyze the impact of majority voting, it will be necessary to make an assumption about 
the number of engineers and artists in the two cities under study. To this end, suppose that there 
are 400 (200) engineers and 200 (400) artists in city ܣ	ሺܤሻ. Both types in the creative class 
contribute uniformly to the provision of the LPG. Clearly, engineers are in the majority in city ܣ. 
As such, the so called median voter theorem13 tells us that the optimal choice ܮ of the LPG in city 
ܣ will be determined by their preferences. Therefore, combining equations (2) and (6), the optimal 
ܮ or ܮ஺ solves 
 
݉ܽݔሼ௅ሽ	200ܮ െ ௅
మ
ଶ െ 5ܮ.      (8) 
 
                                                            
13  
See Hindriks et al. (2013, pp. 351-356) for a textbook discussion of the median voter theorem. 
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Differentiating the maximand in (8) and then simplifying the resulting expression, the ܮ஺ we seek 
is given by 
ܮ஺ ൌ 195.       (9) 
 In contrast to city ܣ, the artists are in the majority in city ܤ. Therefore, the optimal level of 
the LPG in this city or ܮ஻ is given by their preferences. Mathematically, combining equations (2) 
and (7), we are interested in obtaining the solution to  
 
݉ܽݔሼ௅ሽ	100ܮ െ ௅
మ
ଶ െ 5ܮ.      (10) 
 
Solving the maximization problem in (10) and then simplifying, we get 
ܮ஻ ൌ 95.       (11) 
The reader should note that ܮ஺ and ܮ஻ are determined on the basis of uniform contributions and, 
in particular, with majority voting. From this state of affairs, we infer that the minorities in the two 
cities---artists in city ܣ and engineers in city ܤ---will be unhappy with the outcome of majority 
voting specified in equations (9) and (11). Consequently, in principle, the minorities in each of the 
two cities may want to migrate to the other city. Therefore, we now analyze the case in which 
engineers and artists can migrate between the two cities. 
4. Migration between the Two Cities 
4.1. Which creative class type will migrate? 
 The analysis in section 3.3 and, in particular, equations (9) and (11) clearly tell us that the 
minorities in the two cities are unhappy because they get either too little or too much of the LPG. 
Therefore, the minority artists in city ܣ will want to migrate to city ܤ and be a part of the majority 
of artists there. If we denote the gain in utility to the artists from migrating by the function ܷఈሺ∙ሻ	 
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and the two levels of the LPG in question by ܮఈ and ܮఢ then, in symbols, the gain in utility to the 
artists from migration can be expressed as  
ܷఈሺܮఈሻ െ ܷఈሺܮఢሻ ൐ 0.     (12) 
Like the artists, the minority engineers in city ܤ will want to migrate to city ܣ and become 
a part of the majority of engineers. Using notation analogous to that used in the preceding 
paragraph, in symbols, the gain to the engineers from migrating to city ܣ can be written as  
ఢܷሺܮఢሻ െ ఢܷሺܮఈሻ ൐ 0.     (13) 
It should be clear to the reader that this kind of migration allows both engineers and artists to obtain 
their preferred level of the LPG. This notwithstanding, we can certainly ask what the migration 
driven equilibrium distribution of the creative class in the two cities looks like. We now proceed 
to answer this question.  
4.2. The equilibrium distribution of the creative class  
 As a result of the migration delineated in section 4.1, it is straightforward to specify the 
equilibrium distribution of the creative class. Specifically, all the engineers will choose to live in 
city ܣ which is where they were initially in the majority. Similarly, all the artists will choose to 
live in city ܤ which is where they were at first in the majority. Two points are now worth 
emphasizing. First, unfettered migration between cities ܣ and ܤ results in the reinforcement of the 
initial majority in each of these two cities. Second, this kind of migration also results in complete 
segregation by creative class type. In other words, after migration, all engineers (artists) live in 
city ܣ	ሺܤሻ. It should be noted that this kind of segregation arises entirely because of economic 
forces and not because of the innocuous racial preferences (or micromotives) discussed by 
Schelling (1978).  
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 We reiterate that post-migration, every engineer and every artist living either in city ܣ or 
in city ܤ obtains his sought after level of the LPG. In other words, every resident of city ܣ is a 
relatively wealthy engineer who obtains ܮఢ level of the LPG through majority voting. Similarly, 
every individual living in city ܤ is a relatively poor artist who obtains level ܮఈ of the LPG, also 
via majority voting. So, no member of the creative class is unhappy with the post-migration 
distribution of the engineers and the artists across the two cities. We now study whether the 
provision of the LPG in each city is efficient. 
4.3. Efficiency of LPG provision 
 To ascertain whether the provision of the LPG in the two cities is efficient, we shall use 
the so called Samuelson rule.14 There are two ways of interpreting this rule. In the first 
interpretation, this rule requires the provision of a public good to be such that the sum of the 
marginal WTP for the public good is equal to the marginal cost of providing it. In the second 
interpretation, the efficient provision of a public good involves equating the average WTP to the 
per capita marginal cost.  
 When there is no migration---see the analysis in section 3.3---the creative class in city ܣ 
consists of 2 3⁄  engineers and 1 3⁄  artists. In this case, using equations (3), (4), and (5), the efficient 
level of the LPG or ܮ ൌ ܮ෠஺ satisfies 
 
ଶ
ଷ ሺ200 െ ܮሻ ൅
ଵ
ଷ ሺ100 െ ܮሻ ൌ 5.     (14) 
 
Substituting ܮ ൌ ܮ෠஺ in equation (14), this equation can be solved to give us 
                                                            
14  
See Hindriks et al. (2013, pp. 154-156) for a textbook exposition of the Samuelson rule.  
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ܮ෠஺ ൌ ହ଴଴ଷ െ 5	 ⇒ 	ܮ෠஺ ൌ 161.67.     (15) 
 
Similarly, before migration, city ܤ has 2 3⁄  artists and 1 3⁄  engineers. Therefore and once 
again using equations (3), (4), and (5), the efficient level of the LPG or ܮ ൌ ܮ෠஻ is now given by  
 
ଶ
ଷ ሺ100 െ ܮሻ ൅
ଵ
ଷ ሺ200 െ ܮሻ ൌ 5.     (16) 
 
Solving equation (16), using ܮ ൌ ܮ෠஻, we get  
 
ܮ෠஻ ൌ ସ଴଴ଷ െ 5	 ⇒ 	ܮ෠஻ ൌ 128.33.     (17) 
 
Let us now compare the solutions we have just obtained in equations (15) and (17) with 
the corresponding section 3 solutions in equations (9) and (11). We obtain  
95 ൌ ܮ஻ ൏ ܮ෠஻ ൌ 128.33 ൏ 161.67 ൌ ܮ෠஺ ൏ ܮ஺ ൌ 195.   (18) 
We have just seen that without migration, the efficient levels of the LPG in cities ܣ and ܤ are given 
by equations (15) and (17). However, after migration, we have complete or perfect sorting of the 
two types---that together comprise the creative class---across the two cities. What complete or 
prefect sorting means in the context of this paper is that all the engineers live in city ܣ and all the 
artists live in city ܤ. Put differently, unfettered migration gives rise to homogenous communities 
in the two cities under study. That said, note that the efficient provision of the LPG in each city 
matches the level preferred by those who live in this city. These preferred levels are given by 
equations (9) and (11). Therefore, on the basis of our reasoning thus far, we obtain the efficient 
and the preferred levels of the LPG and these are given by  
13 
 
ܮ஻ ൌ ܮ෠஻ ൌ 95	ܽ݊݀	ܮ஺ ൌ ܮ෠஺ ൌ 195.     (19) 
We now proceed to our penultimate task in this paper. Specifically, we want to analyze the 
situation in the two cities just before migration by the engineers and the artists.  
5. The Situation Just Before Migration 
5.1. Optimal provision of the LPG 
 The key point to note is that we now wish to study the scenario in which the LPG is 
provided to members of the creative class in the two cities on the basis of proportional and not 
uniform (see section 3) contributions. To this send, we suppose that an appropriate authority 
requires the wealthier engineers to contribute 3 4⁄  of the cost of the LPG in the city in which they 
choose to reside and the poorer artists are required to contribute 1 4⁄  of the cost of the same LPG. 
Given this stipulation, we now want to know how much of the LPG will be provided with majority 
voting in each of the two cities. 
 Recall that in the uniform cost sharing case studied in section 3, the cost of the LPG per 
creative class member was ܥ ൌ 5ܮ and therefore the marginal cost was simply constant and equal 
to 5. Now, to model the fact that we are working with proportional contributions, let ܥ௜௝ denote the 
marginal cost of providing the LPG to a creative class member of type ݅ ൌ ߙ, ߳ in city ݆ ൌ ܣ, ܤ. 
Given that the engineers (artists) contribute 3 4⁄ 	ሺ1 4ሻ⁄  of the cost of the LPG, it is straightforward 
to confirm that in each city ݆, we have 
ܥఢ௝ ൌ 3ܥఈ௝.       (20) 
Let ߠ௝ denote the fraction of engineers in city ݆ ൌ ܣ, ܤ. Because the average cost of providing the 
LPG per creative class member is ܥ ൌ 5ܮ, it follows that  
 
ߠ௝ܥఢ௝ ൅ ൫1 െ ߠ௝൯ ஼ച
ೕ
ଷ ൌ 5.      (21) 
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Solving equation (21) for the marginal cost of providing the LPG to engineers in city ݆ or ܥఢ௝, we 
get  
 
ܥఢ௝ ൌ ଵହଵାଶఏೕ.       (22) 
 
Using a similar line of reasoning for the artists, the corresponding marginal cost of providing the 
LPG to artists in city ݆ or ܥఈ௝ is  
 
ܥఈ௝ ൌ ହଵାଶఏೕ.       (23) 
 
Inspecting equations (22) and (23), we see that as the fraction of engineers in the creative class or 
ߠ௝ increases, the marginal cost of providing the LPG decreases for both the engineers and the 
artists.  
 From the analysis in section 3.3, we deduce that ߠ஺ ൌ 2 3⁄  and that ߠ஻ ൌ 1 3.⁄  Substituting 
these figures in equations (22) and (23), we get  
 
ܥఢ஺ ൌ ସହ଻ , ܥఈ஺ ൌ
ଵହ
଻ , ܥఢ஻ ൌ 9, ܽ݊݀	ܥఈ஻ ൌ 3.    (24) 
 
The engineers are in a majority in city ܣ and hence they will select their preferred level of the LPG 
in this city. This selection will involve equating the marginal value to the marginal cost. Using 
equations (4) and (24), this means that ܮ ൌ ܮఢ஺ solves  
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200 െ ܮ ൌ ସହ଻ 	⇒ 	ܮఢ஺ ൌ
ଵଷହହ
଻ ൌ 193.57.    (25) 
 
Similarly, the artists are in the majority in city ܤ. Hence, the level of the LPG that is provided in 
this city will be the level that corresponds to their preferred level. Using equations (5) and (24), 
this level ܮ ൌ ܮఈ஻  solves 
100 െ ܮ ൌ 3	 ⇒ 	ܮఈ஻ ൌ 97.      (26) 
 Compared to the case of uniform contributions analyzed in section 3, proportional 
contributions increase the cost of the LPG to the engineers ሺ45 7⁄ ൐ 5ሻ and reduce the same cost 
ሺ3 ൏ 5ሻ to the artists. This means that the engineers will want less of the LPG but the artists will 
want more of the same. Once again compared to the case of uniform contributions, the effect of 
the present state of affairs is to lower the difference in the level of the LPG that is provided across 
the two cities under study.  
Note that like in the uniform contributions case, the level of the LPG that is provided is 
higher in city ܣ because there is a majority of engineers in this city who value the LPG more than 
the artists. However, now with proportional contributions, the engineers have to pay more for the 
LPG than do the artists. This lowers their demand for the LPG and hence, from equations (9) and 
(25), we now have ܮఢ஺ ൌ 193.57 ൏ 195 ൌ ܮ஺.  
In contrast, the demand for the LPG increases in city ܤ which is populated by a majority 
of artists. This is because these artists can now make the engineers pay more for the LPG and 
hence equations (11) and (26) tell us that ܮఈ஻ ൌ 97 ൐ 95 ൌ ܮ஻. Putting these findings together, the 
basic takeaway from the analysis in this section is that proportional contributions have an 
equalizing effect on the dispersion of the levels at which the LPG is provided in the two cities ܣ 
16 
 
and ܤ. We now proceed to our final task in this paper and that is to determine whether, with 
proportional contributions, any creative class type will want to migrate from one city to the other.  
5.2. Does any creative class type want to migrate? 
 An implication of equations (22) and (23) is that migrating engineers tend to reduce the 
cost of providing the LPG and hence, in general, they are worth attracting. Now, consider the 
engineers in city ܤ where the level of the provided LPG is determined by the preferences of the 
artists who are in the majority. Compared to the engineers in city ܣ, these city ܤ engineers get less 
of the LPG---in symbols we have ܮఈ஻ ൏ ܮఢ஺---and they pay a higher cost because there are fewer 
engineers in city ܤ. As such, by migrating to city ܣ, these engineers will obtain their preferred 
level of the LPG at a lower marginal cost because there are more engineers in city ܣ. This line of 
reasoning tells us that all engineers in city ܤ will want to migrate to city ܣ. Therefore, before we 
consider the migration decision of the artists, the fraction of engineers in city ܣ will increase from 
ߠ஺ ൌ 2 3⁄  to ߠ஺ ൌ 600 800 ൌ 3 4⁄⁄  and it will decrease in city ܤ from ߠ஻ ൌ 1 3⁄  to ߠ஻ ൌ 0.  
 Let us now consider the artists in city ܣ. If these artists migrate from city ܣ to ܤ then, using 
ߠ஺ ൌ 3 4⁄  and ߠ஻ ൌ 0, this act raises their marginal contribution cost for the LPG from ܥఈ஺ ൌ
5 ሺ1 ൅ 2ߠ஺⁄ ሻ ൌ 2 to ܥఈ஻ ൌ 5 ሺ1 ൅ 2ߠ஻ሻ ൌ 5.⁄  However, this same act of migration also gives 
them their preferred level of the LPG because they now reside in city ܤ exclusively with other 
artists. Therefore, depending on how the positive impetus (preferred level of the LPG) compares 
with the negative impetus (higher marginal cost), the artists in city ܣ may or may not want to 
migrate to city ܤ. This state of affairs also tells us that there will typically be no equilibrium in this 
model. This will happen either because the artists in city ܣ will want to migrate to city ܤ or, if they 
stay in city ܣ, then the artists in city ܤ will want to migrate to city ܣ. This completes our analysis 
of the use of a LPG by the two cities ܣ and ܤ to attract and retain members of the creative class.  
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6. Conclusions  
 In this paper, we studied the effect that the provision of a LPG by two cities had on their 
ability to attract and retain members of the creative class. This creative class was composed of 
engineers and artists. Engineers were wealthier than artists and they also valued the LPG more. 
We first concentrated on each city in isolation. We computed the marginal value and the marginal 
cost of the LPG and then determined the provision of this LPG when the provision was determined 
by uniform contributions and majority voting. Next, we permitted the creative class members to 
migrate between the two cities and analyzed whether engineers or artists migrated, the equilibrium 
distribution of the creative class, and the efficiency of the LPG provision. Finally, we examined 
the situation in each city just before migration and studied how much of the LPG was provided 
when proportional contributions and majority voting determined this provision. A related question 
we addressed was whether engineers or artists now had an incentive to migrate and we identified 
who wanted to migrate and to which city.  
 An analysis of the sort conducted in this paper can be used to inform the task of using one 
or more LPGs to attract members of the creative class in actual cities of the sort delineated in the 
first paragraph of section 2. In this regard, Cao and Cao (2014) show that the light rail transit 
(LRT) system has been important in impacting residents positively in the Minneapolis and Saint 
Paul metropolitan area. As such, apposite city officials in these two cities can seek to improve 
and/or extend the LRT system as a way of attracting members of the creative class to Minneapolis 
and to Saint Paul. Second, in a comparison of 520 school districts in New York state, Ruggiero 
and Vitaliano (1999) demonstrate that the Buffalo and the Rochester school districts score well in 
terms of the metric of “cost efficiency.” Therefore, officials in these two cities can certainly 
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attempt to attract the creative class to their cities by either maintaining or improving the quality of 
their school districts.  
Third, in his study of the provision of LPGs in Dallas and Fort Worth, Stone (2014) 
contends that “school district quality” is an effective LPG variable. Therefore, as in the case of 
Buffalo and Rochester, city officials in Dallas and Fort Worth can also endeavor to attract the 
creative class to their cities by maintaining or ameliorating the quality of their school districts. 
Fourth, the report of ERS Research and Consultancy (2017) suggests that the health and well-
being impacts of the arts and culture in Newcastle and Gateshead are substantial. Hence, in 
principle, city officials in these two cities can seek out creative class members by focusing on 
artistic and cultural activities. Finally, the work of Musolino (2018) suggests that in order to attract 
the creative class to Reggio Calabria and Messina in Italy, it will be necessary to take steps to 
integrate these two urban areas. This integration can be undertaken by breaking down the 
geographic and other “walls” that presently separate these two cities. One way to do this would be 
to improve the transport infrastructure between and within these two cities.  
 The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. In what 
follows, we suggest three possible extensions. First, using the methods discussed in Acemoglu 
(2009), it would be useful to generalize the analysis conducted here by explicitly analyzing a 
dynamic model in which cities use LPGs and other means to attract and retain members of the 
creative class. Second, in a dynamic setting, creative class members and city authorities will 
typically interact with each other on multiple occasions. Hence, analyzing such interactions 
between creative class members and city authorities in a repeated game setting is likely to be 
instructive.15 Finally, it would also be helpful to embed the aggregate economy of two cities 
                                                            
15  
The methodology employed by Oladi (2004) may be useful here. 
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analyzed here in a probabilistic environment and to then study the impact that uncertainty about 
the marginal cost of LPG provision and/or the migration decision has on the ability of the two 
cities under study to attract and retain members of the creative class. Studies that analyze these 
aspects of the underlying problem will provide additional insights into the roles that artists and 
engineers can play in enhancing the economic well-being of cities.  
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